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Parties to International Commercial
Arbitration Agreements Beware:
Bankruptcy Trumps Supreme Court
Precedent Favoring Arbitration of
International Disputes
Phillips v. Congelton (In re White Mountain Mining Co.)'
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, federal courts have refused to enforce arbitration agreements
when the agreement called for arbitration of claims under four federal statutes-
securities law, anti-trust law, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), and bankruptcy law.2 Recently, the Supreme Court has reversed that
inclination by enforcing agreements that require arbitration of claims arising under
securities, anti-trust, and RICO law. 3 However, the Supreme Court has not yet
addressed enforcement of an arbitration agreement in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding. The lower federal courts have thus been left with the difficult task of
reconciling the general federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments with the conflicting federal policy favoring the resolution of bankruptcy-
related claims in the bankruptcy courts. Lower federal courts concentrate their
analysis of whether to enforce an arbitration agreement involving a bankruptcy
claim on (1) the type of claim that is involved, and (2) whether the agreement
involves domestic or foreign entities.4 Bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over certain types of proceedings, known as "core" proceedings, and they are
particularly protective of their jurisdiction over such proceedings. 5 The domestic/
foreign distinction is important because Supreme Court precedent and federal
policy dictate that the duty to enforce arbitration is even greater in the context of
international arbitration. 6 Phillips v. Congelton (In re White Mountain Mining
Co.), presents a heightened version of the conflict between the general policy
favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements and the policy favoring resolution
1. 403 F.3d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 2005).
2. Fred Neufold, Enforcement of Contractual Arbitration Agreements under the Bankruptcy Code,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 535 (Summer 1991).
3. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), Dean Witter Rey-
nolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985), Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
4. Neufold, supra note 2, at 541, 553.
5. Mette Kurth, Comment, An Unstoppable Mandate and an Immovable Policy: The Arbitration
Act and the Bankruptcy Code Collide, 43 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1021-22 (1996).
6. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614.
1
Biesterfeld: Biesterfeld: Parties to International Commercial Arbitration
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
of bankruptcy-related claims in the bankruptcy court proceedings as the case in-
volves a dispute over the enforcement of an international agreement to arbitrate a
claim that is a "core" bankruptcy proceeding. In Phillips, the Fourth Circuit ana-
lyzed the underlying purposes of both the bankruptcy code and the federal arbitra-
tion statute, and resolved the conflicting purposes of the two by giving greater
deference to the policy favoring resolution of bankruptcy-related claims in bank-
ruptcy court proceedings.
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
Joseph C. Phillips (Phillips) 7 and Arquebuse Trust 8 owned White Mountain
Mining Company, L.L.C. (White Mountain), a mining business located in south-
ern West Virginia.9 In January 2001, Phillips and Arquebuse Trust sold a fifty
percent interest in White Mountain to White Trust, a foreign investment trust.
I0
The parties executed two agreements during the sale: a Sales Agreement" and an
Operation Agreement.12 The Operation Agreement contained an arbitration clause
requiring the parties to use arbitration in the event of any "claim, dispute or con-
troversy of whatever nature arising out of, in connection with, or in relation to the
interpretation, performance or breach of this Agreement (or any other agreement
contemplated by or related to this Agreement)."' 3 The Operation Agreement fur-
ther provided that the arbitration was to be conducted in London, England. 14 The
Sales Agreement inco rorated by reference the arbitration clause contained in the
Operation Agreement.'
The parties also wrote a letter, signed by White Mountain and White Trust
and executed on January 19, 2001 (the January 2001 Letter), which clarified cer-
tain matters prior to the closing.' 6 One such provision required Phillips to ad-
vance money to White Mountain in the event that White Mountain should need
more money than that originally stated in the budgets and pro formas.17 This pro-
7. Joseph C. Phillips is a West Virginia coal operator. Phillips v. Congelton (In re White Mountain
Mining Co.), 403 F.3d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 2005).
8. Arquebuse Trust is a private trust wholly owned by Phillips. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The Sales Agreement called for any disputes to be resolved "in accordance with the Arbitration
provisions of the Operating Agreement as if set out herein." Id.
12. Id. The Operating Agreement required that "each claim, dispute or controversy of whatever
nature, arising out of, in connection with, or in relation to this interpretation, performance or breach of
this Agreement (or any other agreement contemplated by or related to this agreement shall be settled,
at the request of any party to this Agreement, by final and binding arbitration conducted in the City of
London, United Kingdom... in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules then in effect of





17. Id. at 167. The January 2001 Letter provides: "If White Mountain requires additional advances
over the amount that was originally stated in the budgets and proforma's [sic], Phillips will advance
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vision also stated that Phillips would be repaid for these advances after the com-
pany began operations.'8
Following the sale, the ownership of White Mountain changed hands again.
White Trust assigned its fifty percent interest in White Mountain to Congelton,
L.L.C (Congelton) 19 and Phillips and Arquebuse Trust assigned their one-half
interest to Mowbray, L.L.C (Mowbray).2 °
White Mountain began operations at an underground mine in May 2001 under
Phillips' supervision,21 but unfavorable geological conditions forced the mine to
shut down in November 2001.22 The poor geological conditions resulted in finan-
cial difficulties for White Mountain. 23 In an effort to keep White Mountain afloat,
Phillips advanced over $10.6 million of his own money between January 2001 and
June 2002 to help White Mountain meet expenses.
24
A dispute arose between Congelton and Phillips over whether the $10.6 mil-
lion Phillips advanced to White Mountain should be considered capital contribu-
tions or loans. 25 Congelton argued that since Phillips was a shareholder, the $10.6
million should be considered either equity or capital contributions.26 Relying on
the Sales Agreement, Congelton argued that Phillips was obligated to guarantee
the sufficiency of White Mountain's capitalization. 7 Phillips maintained, in con-
trast, that he was acting as a creditor, not a shareholder, and therefore the $10.6
million should properly be considered debt, not equity. 28 Phillips based his asser-
tion on a provision of the January 2001 Letter, which stated that Phillips must be
refunded for any necessary advances he made to White Mountain. 29 Phillips ar-
gued that the $10.6 million was simply one such advance and should therefore
have been considered a loan.
30
Invoking the binding arbitration provision contained in the parties' Sales
Agreement, 31 Congelton and White Trust served Phillips, Arquebuse Trust and
Mowbray with a demand for arbitration in November 2001 .32 Instead of submit-
ting to the arbitration demand, Phillips filed an involuntary Chapter I 1 bankruptcy
petition against White Mountain in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia on June 26, 2002. 33
Two weeks later, Phillips filed suit against White Mountain, Mowbray and
Congelton in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of West
18. Id.
19. Congelton is a West Virginia limited liability company. Id. at 166.
20. Id. Mowbray is a limited liability company wholly owned by Phillips. Id.
21. Id.









31. One of the remedies sought by Congelton and White Trust was a declaration that "advances
made by Phillips to White Mountain should be treated as contributions to capital rather than as loans."
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Virginia in July 2002. 34 Phillips asked the bankruptcy court for a determination
that, under the January 2001 Letter, White Mountain must repay the $10.6 million
and that "he was not obligated to advance additional money to White Mountain."
35
Congelton answered Phillips' complaint by demanding that the bankruptcy court
stay or dismiss the proceeding and compel Phillips to submit his claims to arbitra-
tion.36
The bankruptcy court found that because Phillips' complaint asked the court
to decide whether White Mountain (the debtor) owed Phillips money and whether
Phillips was a creditor or a shareholder, the complaint involved a core bankruptcy
proceeding.37 The bankruptcy court concluded that "the core proceeding trumped
the arbitration" proceeding because arbitration would disturb White Mountain's
ability to reorganize. 8 After refusing to compel arbitration, the bankruptcy court
held an adversary proceeding and determined that Phillips was acting as a creditor
not a shareholder, that Phillips' $10.6 million advance to White Mountain was a
loan pursuant to the January 2001 Letter, and that Phillips was not required to
advance any more funds.
39
Congelton appealed the bankruptcy court's order denying arbitration to the
district court, and both courts denied motions for a stay pending appeal.4° The
district court additionally affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding in favor of Phil-
lips. 41 Congelton appealed both the bankruptcy court's denial of the motion to
compel arbitration and the district court's affirmation of that denial to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 42 In affirming the district court's order, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that when a bankruptcy court is faced with an agreement to arbitrate that
would, if enforced, conflict with the underlying purpose of bankruptcy laws to
centralize disputes, the court can refuse to enforce even international arbitration
agreements.
Il. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Jurisdiction and Purposes of the Bankruptcy Court
Congress established the broad jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts in the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the 1978 Act).44 The goal of the 1978 Act was to





38. Id. at 167, 170.
39. Id. at 167.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 167-68. On appeal, Congelton also argued that "the bankruptcy court was divested of
jurisdiction to try the adversary proceeding once Congelton appealed the denial of arbitration to the
district court, and the injunction against the London arbitration was invalid because it was overly
broad." Id.
43. Id. at 171.
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courts in order to eliminate the division, delay, and cost associated with separate
bankruptcy proceedings.45 The 1978 Act granted to bankruptcy courts original,
but not exclusive, jurisdiction over all proceedings related to a bankruptcy case.46
In order to do this, the statute conferred to the bankruptcy courts all of the juris-
dictional powers granted to the Article III district courts.4
This jurisdictional framework, which gave bankruptcy courts the same au-
thority as district courts, created constitutional problems because the district
courts' jurisdiction is defined by Article III of the Constitution and Article III
imposes certain conditions on the judges who exercise such jurisdiction.48 Article
III requires district court judges to be appointed for life and bankruptcy judges are
not appointed for life.49 The 1978 Act violated Article III of the Constitution,
therefore, by giving the non life tenure bankruptcy court judges jurisdiction that is
constitutionally reserved for judges who are appointed for life.5" In 1982, the
Supreme Court held in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co. 51 that the jurisdictional framework was unconstitutional because the 1978
Act's broad jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy courts took away from the Arti-
cle III district courts the "essential attributes of the judicial power."52
Two years later, Congress amended the 1978 Act with the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 amendments (the Amended
Bankruptcy Code).53 The Amended Bankruptcy Code grants original jurisdiction
over bankruptcy cases to the Article III district courts. Although the district
courts are vested with original jurisdiction, the Amended Bankruptcy Code per-
mits each district court to delegate part of its jurisdiction to a bankruptcy court. 55
While the Amended Bankruptcy Code authorizes district courts to commit pro-
ceedings to bankruptcy courts, the Amended Bankruptcy Code limits the bank-
ruptcy courts' jurisdiction over certain types of proceedings. 56 Bankruptcy courts
have full jurisdiction over claims arising in or arising under title 11- these types
of proceedings are known as "core" bankruptcy proceedings and include claims
involving the administration of the estate and the allowance of claims for or
against the estate. The Amended Bankruptcy Code grants the bankruptcy courts
limited jurisdiction over other types of proceedings-"non-core" bankruptcy pro-
45. See Neufold supra note 2, at 530.
46. See BRA. of 1978, supra note 44.
47. COLLIER ON BANKRUPrTY § 2(b), 3.01 (15th ed. 2005).
48. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86-87 (1982).
49. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY supra note 47.
50. Id.
51. 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
52. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 87.
53. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
346 (1984) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2000)).
54. "[Tjhe district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11." 28
U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2000).
55. "Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy
judges for the district." 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b-c).
57. Supra note 5 at 1009-10; 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). "Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all
cases under title II and all core proceedings arising under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). "Core
proceedings include, but are not limited to-matters concerning the administration of the estate; allow-
ance or disallowance of claims against the estate." 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(A-B).
5
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ceedings, or proceedings that are not considered 'core' but may still effect the
58bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy courts cannot enter orders in non-core pro-
ceedings absent consent of the parties. 59 The jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts
over non-core matters is limited to submitting proposed findings of facts and con-
clusions of law to the district courts. 6° The implication of the core/non-core dis-
tinction is that it is not unusual for a tribunal other than the bankruptcy courts, i.e.
the district court, to decide a non-core proceeding. 6' Core proceedings, on the
other hand, can always be decided by the bankruptcy courts.62
While a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction depends upon whether the issue is
classified as a "core" proceeding or a "non-core" proceeding, Congress has not
specifically defined what constitutes a core proceeding.63  Congress outlined
some, but not all, examples of core proceedings in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). 64 The
fifteen examples of core proceedings illustrated by Congress in 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(2) can be generally categorized as falling into four categories: (1) matters
of administration, (2) avoidance actions, (3) matters concerning property of the
estate and (4) others.65
The list of examples of core proceedings laid out in the Amended Bankruptcy
Code is not all-inclusive. 66 The struggle to define what constitutes a core proceed-
ing has been largely left to the courts. The Fourth Circuit has created guidelines
both by articulating how the Amended Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted 67
and by identifying requisite features of core proceedings. The Fourth Circuit has
characterized a core proceeding as one that is uniquely affected by bankruptcy
rights or that could only arise in the context of a bankruptcy court.6 The Fourth
58. Kurth, supra note 5, at 1010; 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)(2). "A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceed-
ing but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or
judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed
findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely and
specifically objected. The district court, with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding, may refer
a proceeding related to a case under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to enter
appropriate orders and judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)(2).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 157.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A-O).
65. Id.; COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 47. "The reach of the last, or omnibus, category has
been and will continue to be controversial. This category includes the matters set out in section
157(b)(2)(C)-"counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate"-and
section 157(b)(2)(O), "other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the
adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except personal injury tort
or wrongful death claims." Id.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). "Core proceedings include, but are not limited to ..... Id.
67. "In In re American Energy, Inc., 50 Bankr. 175 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (cited with approval in In
re Landbank, 77 Bankr. at 47-48), the court explained: Although Section 157(b)(2) was meant by
Congress to be a non-exclusive list of what might be included in the term "core" proceedings, this
court does not believe the sections or categories should be interpreted or expanded so as to in effect
emasculate the jurisdiction proscriptions of the Marathon case...The decisions In re American Energy,
Inc. and In re Landbank are persuasive...." Helmer v. Murray, 149 B.R. 383, 386 (D. Va. 1993).
68. "Core proceedings either 1) invoke a substantive right provided by the Code or 2) by their na-
ture, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy courts may enter appropriate
[Vol. 2006
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2006, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 17
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss1/17
No. 1] Parties to International Commercial Arbitration Beware 279
Circuit has also recognized certain factors as useful in analyzing whether a pro-
ceeding is "core" or "non-core", such as whether the claim is outlined in the
Amended Bankruptcy Code, whether the claim arose before or after the filing of
the bankruptcy petition, and the effect of the bankruptcy proceeding on the rights
of the parties.69
The jurisdictional framework of the Amended Bankruptcy Code satisfies the
constitutional concerns addressed in Northern Pipeline70 by treating bankruptcy
courts as units of the Article III district courts (rather than as equals) and by limit-
ing bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction over non-core matters. 71 The distinction be-
tween core and non-core proceeding also allows a bankruptcy court to maintain its
principal feature under the 1978 Act--centralization of bankruptcy proceedings.
72
B. The Growth of International Arbitration Agreements
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)73 was enacted in 1925 to "reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements. 74 The FAA mandates
that written agreements to arbitrate any existing or future disputes arising out of a
commercial contract or transaction are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract."75 The general rule that arbitration agreements are enforceable expanded to
include arbitration agreements in international commercial contracts when the
United States acceded to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (the Convention) in 1970.76 Congress incorporated the
Convention into the United States Arbitration Act.77 The United States Arbitra-
tion Act requires the courts to recognize and enforce arbitration agreements be-
orders and judgments in core proceedings." Heckert v. Dotson (In re Heckert), 226 B.R. 558, 561 (D.
W. Va. 1998). See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Goldberg, 135 B.R. 788, 791 (D. Md. 1992).
69. Hudgins v. Shah (In re Systems Eng'g & Energy Mgmt. Assocs.), 252 B.R. 635, 642 (Bankr. D.
Va. 2000). "This Court previously has set forth a number of factors to review in this core/non-core
determination. In Seven Springs, Inc. v. Abramson (In re Seven Springs, Inc.), 148 B.R. 815 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1992), the Court, in concluding that the claim in question was not core, but was an otherwise
related proceeding, examined the following factors: (l)[The claim] is not specifically identified as a
core proceeding under [28 U.S.C.] § 157(b)(2)(B). (2) [The claim] existed prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy case. (3) [The claim] would continue to exist independent of the provisions of Title 11,
and (4) The parties' rights, obligations or both are not significantly affected as a result of the filing of
the bankruptcy case." Id.
70. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
71. Kurth, supra note 5, at 1009. See Jeffrey Ferriell, Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 63 AM BANKR. L.J. 109, 110 (Spring 1989).
72. Kurth, supra note 5, at 1009.
73. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-12 (2000).
74. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
75. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
76. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). "Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which
may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concern-
ing a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration." Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, art. II, December 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
77. 9 U.S.C. § 201. "The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter."
Id.
7
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tween parties to an international commercial contract. 78 After the United States
acceded to the Convention, the Supreme Court explained that special treatment of
international arbitration agreements is necessary because refusal to enforce inter-
national arbitration agreements "would surely damage the fabric of international
commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to
enter into international agreements." 79 The combination of the FAA, the Conven-
tion, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have resulted in such a strong fed-
eral policy in favor of arbitration agreements that arbitration agreements are now
characterized as "super contracts" 80 and "an unstoppable force in modern contract
law."
81
C. The Courts Attempt to Reconcile Arbitration of Federal Statutory
Claims
At least until 1985, federal appellate courts had not applied the FAA to four
statutory areas: securities law, anti trust law, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO),, and bankruptcy law.82 One of the Supreme Court's
major tasks in establishing a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration agree-
ments was to reverse this trend and to enforce arbitration agreements of federal
statutory claims.
83
The Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.,84 is significant for three reasons. First, the Supreme Court ex-
tended the FAA to one of the previously excluded federal statutory claims-
antitrust law. 85 Second, the Court emphasized the particular importance of en-
forcing arbitration agreements that arise in the international commercial context.
86
Third, the Court created a framework for future courts to use in deciding if a fed-
eral statutory claim was exempt from the FAA.
Prior to Mitsubishi, the federal courts had consistently refused to enforce
agreements to arbitrate antitrust claims due to the "fundamental importance to
American democratic capitalism of the regime of antitrust laws." 87 The Supreme
Court agreed that the purposes of the antitrust laws were to promote "the national
interest in competitive economy" and to "protect the public's interest., 88 Despite
78. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
79. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974).
80. Note, Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy Proceedings: A Test Case for Implied Repeal of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2296 (2004).
81. Id.
82. Neufold, supra note 2, at 535.
83. Major Supreme Court decisions expanding the reach of the FAA include Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (holding that FAA applies to state and federal
claims); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (requiring enforcement of arbitrable
claims even if intertwined with non-arbitrable claims). Id. at 532.
84. 473 U.S. 614, 639 (1985).
85. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639 (1985). The
Mitsibushi decision also rejected the argument that an arbitration clause of an international commerce
clause would only apply to claims arising out of federal statutes if the arbitration clause specifically
included those rights. Id. at 625.
86. Id. at 629.
87. See id. at 634.
88. Id. at 635.
[Vol. 2006
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these strong policies in favor of having antitrust claims decided in a domestic
forum, the Supreme Court relied on the "concerns of international comity, respect
for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need
of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of dis-
putes" in enforcing the arbitration agreement. 89 The court in Mitsubishi declared
that international arbitration agreements would be enforced even when a different
result would be reached in a domestic tribunal. 90 The court also recognized that,
while the FAA embodies a strong federal policy in support of arbitration, the FAA
is still a statute. As a statute, the FAA can be limited by proof that Congress, in a
subsequent act, intended to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements of
certain categories of claims.
9 1
Two years after the Mitsubishi decision, the Supreme Court clarified how
congressional intent can be used to avoid arbitration, and decided that both RICO
and Securities Act claims are arbitrable. 92 In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,93 the Court set out a three-part test (the "McMahon test") for determin-
ing whether an agreement to arbitrate a claim arising out of a federal statute is
enforceable. 94 Under the McMahon test, a party claiming that an agreement to
arbitrate a statutory claim is not enforceable must prove Congressional intent to
make an exception to the FAA from either 1) the text of the statute, 2) the legisla-
tive history of the statute, or 3) an inherent conflict between arbitration and the
purposes of the statute. 95 The Supreme Court has expressly applied the FAA to
three out of the four federal statutes that were previously considered exceptions to
the FAA. 96 The arbitrability of the fourth federal statute previously excluded from
the FAA, bankruptcy, the Court left to be decided by the federal lower courts.
In Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the Third Cir-
cuit dealt with an agreement to arbitrate a bankruptcy proceeding for the first time
under the Supreme Court's new framework.97 The Hays court overruled Zimmer-
man v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 98 a 1983 Third Circuit case that interpreted the
1978 Act "to impliedly modify" the FAA so that the decision to enforce an arbi-
tration agreement was within the "sound discretion" of the bankruptcy courts. 99 In
Hays, the court faced an agreement to arbitrate a non-core bankruptcy proceed-
89. Id. at 629.
90. Id.
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for
predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even
assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.
Id.
91. See id. at 627-28, 639 n.21. The Convention "contemplates exceptions to arbitrability grounded
in domestic law." Id. at 639 n.2 1.
92. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227, 238, 242 (1987). The Securi-
ties Act and RICO, passed in 1934 and 1970, respectively, were federal statutes enacted subsequent to
the FAA, passed in 1925. See id. at 227, 241.
93. 428 U.S. 220 (1987).
94. Id. at 227.
95. Id.
96. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628-29; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242.
97. 885 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1989).
98. 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983).
99. Id. at 59-60.
9
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ing.1°° The Amended Bankruptcy Code authorizes non-core matters to be heard
by the district court itself,' 0' to be referred to the bankruptcy courts only upon
agreement by all parties to the dispute.10 2 If the non-core proceeding is referred to
a bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court's proposed findings are subject to de
novo review upon any party's objection. 0 3 The Hays court reasoned that these
amendments to the 1978 Act (the Amended Bankruptcy Code) demonstrated that
Congress no longer intended for the Bankruptcy Code to modify the FAA. 104 The
Third Circuit then reversed the district court's decision refusing to enforce the
arbitration agreement, holding that the case should have been decided under the
third part of the McMahon test. ° 5 The Third Circuit held that because non-core
proceedings were not exclusively heard in the bankruptcy courts-and because
those that were heard in the bankruptcy courts were subject to the time consuming
possibility of review-no irreconcilable conflict existed between the FAA and the
Bankruptcy Act for non-core claims, and so the lower court should not have de-
nied enforcement of the arbitration agreement. 106
The Third Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit stand alone in expressly rejecting
Zimmerman, 107 yet virtually every circuit agrees with the underlying premise of
Hays that once a proceeding is classified as non-core, the likelihood of avoiding
enforcement of an arbitration agreement under the McMahon test significantly
decreases. 10 8 After Hays, courts have continued to emphasize the importance of
100. See Hays, 885 F.2d at 1150.
101. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 1334(b) (2005).
102. Id. § 157(c)(1), (2).
103. Id. § 157(c)(1).
A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise re-
lated to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall
be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings and
conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely and specifi-
cally objected.
Id.
104. Hays, 885 F.2d at 1161. The Third Circuit's rejection of Zimmerman is still the minority view; it
is the only court to expressly overrule Zimmerman. See Neufold, supra note 2, at 545-52.
105. Hays, 885 F.2d at 1156-57.
106. Id at 1158.
107. See RDM Sports Group, Inc. v. Equitex, Inc. (In re RDM Sports Group, Inc.), 260 B.R. 905,
913-14 (Bankr. D. Ga. 2001). "This [c]ourt prefers the Hays logic, as opposed to that articulated in
Zimmerman." Id
108. While the circuits vary in the degree of importance placed on the core/non-core distinction,
virtually all courts agree that the distinction is instructive. See Larocque v. CitiFinancial Mortg. Com-
pany-TX (In re Larocque), 283 B.R. 640, 642 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2002) (First Circuit: "I also conclude that
this adversary proceeding is a core matter, which strongly favors it staying in the Bankruptcy Court.");
U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n (In re U.S. Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631,
640 (2nd Cir. 1999) ("Such a conflict is lessened in non-core proceedings which are unlikely to present
a conflict sufficient to override by implication the presumption in favor of arbitration."); Videsh
Sanchar Nigam, Ltd. v. Startec Global Commc'ns Corp. (In re Startec Global Commc'ns Corp.), 300
B.R. 244, 254 (Bankr. D. Md. 2003) (Fourth Circuit: "Finding that a claim is core is often a factor in
finding that a court has discretion to refuse to compel arbitration."); Gandy v. Gandy (In re Gandy),
299 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2002) ("It is generally accepted that a bankruptcy court has no discretion to
refuse to compel the arbitration of matters not involving 'core' bankruptcy proceeding under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)."); Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Seelbinder (In re Cooker Restaurant Corp.), 292 B.R. 308, 311
(D. Ohio 2003) (Sixth Circuit: "A number of circuits have reached the conclusion that bankruptcy
courts, in virtually all instances, must compel arbitration regarding non-core proceedings."); In re
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the distinction between core and non-core proceedings in determining the outcome
of the third part of the McMahon test.' °
District courts in the Fourth Circuit agree that the likelihood of an inherent
conflict between the purposes of the Amended Bankruptcy Code and the FAA are
greater when the dispute involves an agreement to arbitrate a core proceeding.1
0
The Fourth Circuit has not adopted a bright line rule allowing bankruptcy courts'
discretion to stay arbitration whenever the agreement to arbitrate involves a core
proceeding. In the Fourth Circuit, a court's determination that a proceeding is
core increases the likelihood that a bankruptcy court may refuse to compel arbitra-
tion, but the core/non-core distinction is not dispositive."'
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Phillips v. Congelton (In re White Mountain Mining Co.), 1 12 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with deciding whether to enforce an interna-
tional commercial agreement to arbitrate a core bankruptcy proceeding." 3 The
court reviewed the district and bankruptcy courts' conclusions of law de novo, and
the bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear error. 14
The court began its analysis by recognizing federal courts' duty to enforce
valid arbitration agreements under the FAA.' 1' The court identified the added
weight this duty has carried in the international commercial setting ever since the
United States joined the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Aribtral Awards in 1970.116 The court acknowledged, however, that the duty
to enforce international arbitration agreements was rooted in statute, i.e., the FAA,
George Foreman Foods, Inc., 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 25 (Banr. D. Neb. 2005) (Eighth Circuit: "Any
conflict between the Bankruptcy Code, which favors centralization of disputes concerning a debtor's
estate, and the Arbitration Act, which advocates a decentralized approach to dispute resolution, is
lessened in non-core proceedings which are unlikely to present a conflict sufficient to override by
implication the presumption in favor of arbitration."); McDonald v. Cash N Advance, Inc. (In re Lu-
cas), 312 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2004) (Ninth Circuit: The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel has adopted the emerging majority rule that the bankruptcy court has no discretion to enforce an
otherwise enforceable arbitration provision in a noncore proceeding."); Hicks v. Homeq Servicing
Corp. (In re Hicks), 285 B.R. 317, 321 (Bankr. D. Okla. 2002) (Tenth Circuit: "Courts have held that
bankruptcy courts have little or no discretion to refuse to compel the arbitration of proceedings not
deemed to be core proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2005)."; Durango Ga. Converting,
LLC v. TST Impreso, Inc. (In re Durango Ga. Paper Co.), 309 B.R. 394, 401 (Bankr. D. Ga. 2004)
(Eleventh Circuit: "The Court, unwilling to use a straight line test for core and non-core matters, does
find this distinction helpful in addressing the extent enforcement of an arbitration clause will conflict
with the purpose and provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.").
109. See supra note 108.
110. See, e.g., Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Startec Global Conmc'ns Corp. (In re Startec Global
Commc'ns Corp.), 300 B.R. 244, 252 (D. Md. 2003). "In a core proceeding, the bankruptcy court's
interest is greater, as is the risk of a conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the Arbitration Act."
Id.
111. Id. at 254.
112. 403 F.3d 164, (4th Cir. 2005).
113. See id. at 168.
114. Id. As for the bankruptcy court's findings of fact, the appellate court found nothing to be clearly
erroneous and took the facts as they were presented by the lower courts. Id at 170.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see supra notes 75-76.
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and therefore later, congressionally-created exceptions could modify the duty.,
1 7
The court then summarized the McMahon test, finding it to be the appropriate
method to determine whether a congressionally created exception to the general
duty to enforce arbitration agreements existed in this case.
118
After discussing arbitration generally, the court then moved to a brief expla-
nation of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction under the Amended Bankruptcy
Code. The court stated the general rule that bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction
over core proceedings. 119 In an attempt to give some meaning to the term "core
proceeding," the court limited its definition by citing the first two examples of
core proceedings listed in the Amended Bankruptcy Code: "core proceedings
include, for example, 'matters concerning the administration of the estate' and the
'allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate."'' 120 The court then con-
cluded that, since Phillips sought a determination that White Mountain (the
debtor) owed him money, this case involved a core proceeding.
121
Satisfied that the Phillips-Congelton dispute involved a core proceeding, the
court introduced the McMahon test. The court briefly addressed the first part of
the McMahon test-whether congressional intent to prohibit arbitration of core
issues is deducible from the statutory text-and noted that this issue could be
argued both ways.12  The court recognized that some circuits, like the First Cir-
cuit, have held that the text of the Amended Bankruptcy Code requires bankruptcy
courts to serve as the exclusive forum for adjudication of core proceedings.
123
The First Circuit has adopted a bright-line rule preventing bankruptcy courts from
enforcing arbitration agreements that involve core proceedings. 24 The court also
recognized that other circuits, like the Second Circuit, have held that courts should
not automatically refuse to enforce arbitration of all core proceedings.12 5 Al-
though the court acknowledged both arguments, the court did not decide whether
or not it accepted the First Circuit's bright-line approach, and the court did not
even mention the second part of the McMahon test, because the court found that
the case would be best resolved under the third prong of the McMahon test.'
26
In applying the third part of the test, the court asked whether a conflict existed
between the underlying purposes of the FAA and the bankruptcy laws as aplied
to international arbitration agreements and core bankruptcy proceedings. It
117. Phillips, 403 F.3d at 168.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 168-69.
120. Id. at 169 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (B) (2005)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. "[Ihe statutory text giving bankruptcy courts core-issue jurisdiction reveals a congressional
intent to choose those courts in exclusive preference to all other adjudicative bodies, including boards
of arbitration, to decide core claims." Id. (citing Sisters of Providence Health Sys., Inc. v. Summerfield
Elm Manor (In Re Summerfield Pine Manor), 219 B.R. 637, 638 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998)).
124. See id.
125. Id. "A determination that a proceeding is core will not automatically give the bankruptcy court
discretion to stay arbitration." Id. (citing U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem.
Ass'n, Inc. (In re U.S. Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 640 (2d Cir. 1999)).
126. Id. The second part of the McMahon test asks whether a congressional exception to the arbitra-
tion agreement can be implied from the legislative history of the Amended Bankruptcy Code. Shear-
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found that allowing debtor-creditor rights to be determined by an arbitrator was
inconsistent with the purpose of the bankruptcy laws to centralize bankruptcy
disputes.12  After affirming the bankruptcy court's finding that the arbitration
would have significantly undermined White Mountain's ability to reorganize, the
court concluded that the conflict of purposes between the statutes was particularly
apparent in this type of core proceeding, and the bankruptcy court's refusal to
order arbitration between Congelton and Phillips was affirmed.
129
V. COMMENT
A. How the Court Should Have Used the McMahon Test
In Phillips, the Fourth Circuit failed to properly apply Supreme Court prece-
dent. The court did not weigh the purposes of the Amended Bankruptcy Code
against the purposes of the FAA as required by the McMahon test. Instead, the
court adapted the outer framework of the McMahon test to fit its own version of
federal policy---centralization of bankruptcy proceedings above all other interests.
While the court stated that its decision was based on the third part of the McMa-
hon test, a comparison between the Supreme Court's and the instant court's analy-
ses of the same test reveals that the purposes of the Amended Bankruptcy Code
were not so important as to warrant a finding that the FAA was inapplicable.
The McMahon test was adapted from the 1985 Supreme Court case, Mitsubi-
shi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.130 Mitsubishi is particularly
instructive in Phillips because in Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court, like the instant
court, essentially used the third part of the McMahon test' 3' to decide whether an
international commercial agreement to arbitrate a federal statutory claim should be
enforced. 32 The premise of the third part of the McMahon test is clearly ex-
plained by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi--the concerns of the federal statute
must be weighed against "a strong belief in the efficacy of arbitral procedures for
the resolution of international commercial disputes," 1 33and "any doubts concern-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 170. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the bankruptcy court's findings that: "an ongoing
arbitration proceeding in London would (1) make it very difficult for the debtor to attract additional
funding because of the uncertainty as to whether Phillip's claim was debt or equity, (2) undermine
creditor confidence in the debtor's ability to reorganize, (3) undermine the confidence of other parties
doing business with the debtor, and (4) impose additional costs on the estate and diver the attention and
time of the debtor's management." Id. Congelton also raised two additional arguments on appeal: that
its notice of appeal to the district court divested the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction over the adversary
proceeding, and that the bankruptcy court's injunction against the London arbitration was overly
broad. Id. at 170-71. The court briefly answered both arguments, dismissing the first as moot, and
holding on the second issue that "because Congeleton does not request alternative relief, or suggest
what alternative relief might be appropriate, we decline to modify the injunction." Id. at 171.
130. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632-37 (1985).
131. In McMahon, the Supreme Court cites to Mitsubishi as the source of the three-part test: "If
Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent
'will be deducible from' ... an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying pur-
poses." Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987) (citing Mitsubi-
shi, 473 U.S. at 632-37).
132. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 616.
133. Id. at 631.
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ing the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration."'1 34 In
setting the foundation for the McMahon test, the Mitsubishi opinion was largely
devoted to emphasizing the seriousness of the purposes underlying the FAA. The
Supreme Court observed that one underlying purpose of the FAA was to protect
party autonomy and principles of contract interpretation.'35 In order to give mean-
ing to this purpose, the Supreme Court recognized that all courts were necessarily
required to "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."' 36 The Mitsubishi court
also recognized an even greater purpose underlying the FAA in the international
commercial context, explaining that the success of the American economy de-
pended upon international businessmen's willingness to enter into, and ability to
rely upon, arbitration contracts made with Americans. 37 The Supreme Court
concluded by stating that national courts must "subordinate domestic notions of
arbitrability to the international policy favoring commercial arbitration."'
' 38
Notwithstanding the striking similarities between Mitsubishi and Phillips-
both cases involved international commercial agreements to arbitrate federal statu-
tory claims, and both cases were apparently applying the same test-the instant
court's opinion stands in stark contrast to the Mitsubishi opinion. The Fourth
Circuit not only neglected to weigh the purposes of the Amended Bankruptcy
Code against the strong presumption in favor of enforcing international commer-
cial arbitration agreements, but the court completely omitted the purposes under-
lying the FAA from its analysis of conflicting purposes. The Fourth Circuit's
analysis under the McMahon test failed to mention a single purpose underlying
the FAA, even though the court purported to be using a test adapted from a case
which clearly outlines several.
Although Mitsubishi involved a federal antitrust claim that was previously
considered non-arbitrable, and although the Court conceded that the antitrust laws
held "fundamental importance to the American democratic capitalism," the Court
maintained its emphasis on the importance of enforcing international arbitration
agreements, and enforced the arbitration agreement.' 39 There is no explanation in
Phillips as to why the purposes underlying the Amended Bankruptcy Code de-
served such greater deference than the purposes underlying anti trust law so as to
result in such an insulated McMahon analysis that the purposes of the FAA, even
when applied to an international commercial setting, were completely abandoned.
B. How the Court Actually Used the McMahon Test
Instead of weighing the purposes of the Amended Bankruptcy Code against
the purposes underlying the FAA as required by the McMahon test, the Fourth
Circuit used the McMahon test to detail how arbitration of Phillips's claim would
134. Id. at 626.
135. Id. at 625-26.
136. Id. "'The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the [FAA] was to enforce private agree-
ments into which parties had entered,' a concern which 'requires that we rigorously enforce agree-
ments to arbitrate.' Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
137. Id. at 629-30. The Supreme Court emphasized that "the expansion of American business and
industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we [the courts] insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts." Id. at 629.
138. Id. at 638-39.
139. See id. at 634.
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conflict with the purposes underlying bankruptcy. While the Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed the strong federal policy and duty to enforce associated with international
commercial arbitration agreements at the beginning of its opinion, such considera-
tion was not a part of its McMahon analysis. Once the court decided that Phil-
lips's claim involved a core bankruptcy proceeding, the court began its McMahon
analysis and there was no further discussion of the purposes of the FAA.
Like most circuits, the outcome in the Fourth Circuit under the McMahon test
varies depending upon whether the bankruptcy proceeding is considered "core" or
"non-core."' 4 Again following suit with the other circuits, the Fourth Circuit has
made clear that core proceedings are more likely to conflict with arbitration than
non core proceedings.' 41 One explanation for the courts' pattern of finding core
proceedings more likely to conflict with arbitration than non-core proceedings is
that bankruptcy courts are particularly protective of their jurisdiction over core
bankruptcy claims.142 The Amended Bankruptcy code prohibits the bankruptcy
courts from automatically exercising full jurisdiction over any type of claim other
than core bankruptcy proceedings, and so relinquishing this jurisdiction and al-
lowing an arbitrator to decide a core claim is more troublesome for the courts than
it is for an arbitrator to decide a claim over which the bankruptcy courts do not
automatically have full jurisdiction. 143
A second reason why bankruptcy courts are reluctant to forgo their jurisdic-
tion over core bankruptcy proceedings has to do with one of the purposes underly-
ing bankruptcy law--centralization of bankruptcy proceedings. 144 The goal of
centralizing bankruptcy disputes into one forum has caused the lower courts diffi-
culty in reconciling arbitration with bankruptcy. In the instant case, the court
focused on this purpose of bankruptcy in deciding whether or not to enforce the
arbitration agreement under the third part of the McMahon test. 45 On one level,
arbitration of bankruptcy proceedings clearly conflicts with the goal of centraliza-
tion because it allows core proceedings to be decided in forums other than the
bankruptcy courts. However, the court's exclusive focus on the goal of centraliza-
tion and failure to examine the purposes of the FAA caused the court to ignore the
underlying purposes shared by both the bankruptcy and the arbitration statutes. 146
Due to the limited financial resources available in the bankruptcy context, one of
140. See supra note 110.
141. See supra note 110.
142. See Kurth, supra note 5, at 1021-22.
143. See id.
144. See Phillips v. Congelton (In re White Mountain Mining Co.), 403 F.3d 164, 169-70 (4th Cir.
2005).
145. Id. "Congress intended to centralize disputes about a debtor's assets and legal obligations in the
bankruptcy courts." Id. at 169. "Arbitration is inconsistent with centralized decision-making." Id.
"Centralization of disputes concerning a debtor's legal obligations is especially critical in chapter 11
cases, like White Mountain's." l. at 170. "To protect reorganizing debtors and their creditors from
piecemeal litigation, the bankruptcy laws 'centralize all disputes."' Id. (quoting Shugrue v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.) 922 F.2d 984, 989 (2d Cir. 1990)). "Finally [the
bankruptcy] court found that allowing the adversary proceeding to go forward would allow all credi-
tors, owners and parties in interest to participate in a centralized proceeding." Id. "[The bankruptcy
court's] findings confirm that the London arbitration was inconsistent with the purpose of the bank-
ruptcy laws to centralize disputes... accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not err in refusing to order
arbitration." Id.
146. See Lisa A. Lomax, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy: Rule 9019 and Bankruptcy
Mediation Programs, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 63 (1994).
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the primary purposes of bankruptcy courts is to reduce the delay and expense
associated with litigation.147 Arbitration was also designed to decrease the cost
and length associated with traditional litigation.'
48
Once the proceeding is classified as core, most courts move to the third part
of the McMahon test to determine if arbitration will be enforced. 149 The circuits
have latched onto the third "irreconcilable conflict" part of the McMahon test in
order to protect the centralization purpose of bankruptcy. 50 The lower courts'
pattern of finding that core proceedings are more likely to conflict with bank-
ruptcy than non-core proceedings is particularly significant under the third part of
the McMahon test, which is essentially a conflict of purposes test. Instead of us-
ing the conflict of purposes test to weigh the purposes of bankruptcy against the
purposes of arbitration, the instant opinion reveals how a court can misuse the test
by focusing on how arbitration would conflict with the purposes of bankruptcy
instead of weighing those purposes against the purposes of arbitration, as the Su-
preme Court intended. The Fourth Circuit used the irreconcilable conflict test to




In the instant case, after deciding that Phillips brought a core proceeding, the
rest of the court's opinion focused exclusively on protecting the purposes underly-
ing bankruptcy. The court's opinion exposes the impact of a court's decision that
a proceeding is core-the likelihood that arbitration will be refused increases and
the scope of the ensuing analysis will be limited to the underlying purposes of
bankruptcy.15 2 The court's failure to address a single purpose underlying interna-
tional arbitration under the McMahon test reveals the outcome-determinative na-
ture of the court's decision that Phillips's claim involved a core bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. In the context of core proceedings, the Fourth Circuit has used the
McMahon test to let bankruptcy trump "emphatic federal policy" and Supreme
Court precedent in favor of international commercial arbitration through exclusive
reliance on the purposes underlying the Amended Bankruptcy Code.
The lower federal courts have previously demonstrated how the desire to cen-
tralize bankruptcy claims can get out of hand. In 1978, the bankruptcy courts
were given so much power to centralize bankruptcy proceedings that the Supreme
Court declared the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts unconstitutional."' While the
bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction is now constitutionally safeguarded by the
core/non-core distinction,' 54 the goal of centralizing bankruptcy disputes is begin-
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Phillips, 403 F.3d at 169.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 169-70.
152. See Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Startec Global Commc'ns Corp. (In re Startec Global
Commc'ns Corp.), 300 B.R. 244, 252 (D. Md. 2003) "In a core proceeding, the bankruptcy court's
interest is greater, as is the risk of a conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the Arbitration Act."
id. See also Phillips, 403 F.3d at 169-70.
153. See generally N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
154. See The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 346; 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It Is Time to
Overrule Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 311 (1991).
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ning to create new problems by over-riding the strong federal policy in favor of
international commercial arbitration.
C. Misusing the McMahon Test Hurts International Commerce
When courts refuse to enforce valid arbitration contracts, international com-
merce suffers. The Supreme Court has recognized that American courts must be
sensitive to "the need of the international commercial system for predictability in
the resolution of disputes."'1 55 In order to maintain healthy international com-
merce, parties must be able to rely upon international commercial contracts.
When valid international commercial arbitration contracts are not enforced be-
cause arbitration would conflict with the purposes of bankruptcy, courts replace
predictability with uncertainty and damage international commerce. If courts
want to support economic growth, they must allow disputes to be resolved under
different laws and in foreign tribunals. 1
56
The Supreme Court has taken this duty seriously, by enforcing international
arbitration of federal statutory claims, even when the private cause of action pro-
vides an important "policing function" in our nation, 57 and even when "a contrary
result would be forthcoming in a domestic context." 58 Despite the Supreme
Court's endorsement, the lower federal courts continue to not enforce agreements
to arbitrate core bankruptcy proceedin s, thus upsetting the Supreme Court's sup-
port of international economic growth.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit's opinion reveals the lingering judicial hostility of the
lower federal courts toward arbitration. Although the court may have appeared to
follow Supreme Court case law by adopting the basic framework of McMahon,
the court's reasoning deviated sharply from the intended analysis as demonstrated
in Mitsubishi. This court's opinion suggests that instead of resolving the conflict-
ing statutes by weighing the underlying purposes as established in Mitsubishi, the
court will stubbornly preserve the bankruptcy courts' exclusive jurisdiction of
core proceedings even when the parties have contracted to the contrary. By fail-
ing to consider the international character of the arbitration agreement under the
McMahon test, the court implicitly rejected the unique obligations the Supreme
Court has imposed upon the lower federal courts in the context of international
commerce. The Fourth Circuit not only failed to take account of the particular
duty to enforce arbitration in the international commercial context as set forth by
the Supreme Court, but the court's holding also harms international commerce by
suggesting that parties cannot confidently rely on international commercial arbi-
trations agreements whenever there is a chance that a core bankruptcy disputes
may result. Despite the strong steps the Supreme Court has taken to support in-
155. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
156. See id. at 629-30, 638-39.
157. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240 (1987).
158. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
159. See supra note 110.
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ternational commerce, parties' reliance on international commercial arbitration
agreements will continue to be misplaced in the event of a dispute involving a
core bankruptcy proceeding unless and until the Supreme Court enforces an
agreement to arbitrate a core bankruptcy proceeding.
LINDSAY BIESTERFELD
18
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2006, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 17
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss1/17
